{"id":1164,"date":"2013-09-03T05:55:04","date_gmt":"2013-09-03T05:55:04","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/column.bankerstrust.in\/columns\/?p=1164"},"modified":"2016-12-27T10:50:02","modified_gmt":"2016-12-27T10:50:02","slug":"d-subbarao-the-govt-insider-who-turned-rebel","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/bankerstrust.in\/column\/d-subbarao-the-govt-insider-who-turned-rebel\/","title":{"rendered":"D. Subbarao: The govt insider who turned rebel"},"content":{"rendered":"<p>Mumbai: If not for anything else, the D. Subbarao regime at the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) that ends with his retirement on Wednesday will be remembered for his relentless fight with the finance ministry for the central bank\u2019s independence.<br \/>\nHis predecessor Y.V. Reddy too was involved in similar fights\u2014which were more severe than an India-China war, a colleague of Reddy says in jest\u2014but the details are not in the public domain. Also, Reddy\u2019s run-ins with the finance ministry were more on specific issues while Subbarao fought on broader policy issues.<br \/>\nUnlike Reddy, who was also a civil servant, Subbarao\u2019s passage to Mint Road from the finance ministry in 2008 was direct. He was given preference over Reddy\u2019s deputy Rakesh Mohan for the top job. In that sense, he was seen as a Trojan horse, so his fights with the ministry have been baffling.<br \/>\nThe first came to the fore on the constitution of the Financial Stability and Development Council. Ahead of that, an 18 June 2010 ordinance empowered the finance ministry to resolve all disputes between the regulators. Subbarao immediately wrote to the then finance minister Pranab Mukherjee, saying \u201cthe appearance of autonomy is as important as the actual autonomy itself\u201d, and \u201cthe very existence of a joint committee (the council) will sow seeds of doubt in public mind about the independence of regulators\u201d.<br \/>\n\u201cThe establishment of a statutory joint committee is itself problematic and raises issues about its potential misuse in ways that impair the autonomy of the regulators,\u201d Subbarao wrote. \u201c\u2026The ordinance has seeming implications for regulatory autonomy and sows seeds of doubts where none exist. My earnest request to you is to allow the ordinance to lapse. If that option is not acceptable, the portion of the ordinance relating to the RBI Act may be deleted.\u201d<br \/>\nMukherjee did not pay heed.<br \/>\nThis is one of the many issues on which the governor did not see eye to eye with the government. He has also not been comfortable with the idea of divesting RBI of its debt management function and has strong reservations on the report of the Financial Sector Legislative Reforms Commission, which has proposed taking away many of RBI\u2019s functions.<br \/>\nSubbarao&#8217;s belief is that it\u2019s the responsibility of the governor to speak up. In that sense, he is a keen follower of one of his predecessors, economist I.G. Patel (December 1977 to September 1982) whose advice was something on these lines: \u201cDon\u2019t nitpick. Pick your battles. Once you have picked your battles, fight those battles valiantly.\u201d<br \/>\nBut even while fighting for the central bank\u2019s freedom and autonomy, Subbarao religiously met the finance minister and Prime Minister to keep them abreast of what the central bank would do before every quarterly review of monetary policy\u2014a ritual symbolic of RBI\u2019s lack of true independence.<br \/>\nOf course, he could have done that in stealth\u2014say meeting the finance minister at his residence at night or avoiding the main gate when entering North Block, where the ministry is housed, to dodge the media\u2014but Subbarao did not want to deviate from the tradition of revealing the content of the policy to the government ahead of making it public.<br \/>\nHistorically, RBI governors keep the finance ministry informed of the policy decisions before announcing them; Subbarao kept the Prime Minister also in the loop. Another person who is perceived to be close to Subbarao is former RBI governor and now chairman of the Prime Minister\u2019s Economic Advisory Council C. Rangarajan. Subbarao had worked for the council between 2005 and 2007 before becoming India\u2019s finance secretary.<br \/>\nManmohan Singh\u2019s advice<br \/>\nBefore he took over as governor of RBI in September 2008, Subbarao met Manmohan Singh for his advice. The meeting turned out to be more than a formality. Singh, who was an RBI governor between September 1982 and January 1985, told him that in RBI one runs the risk of losing touch with the real world with the mind space fully taken up by issues like interest rates, liquidity traps and monetary policy transmission. But monetary policy is about reducing hunger and malnutrition, creating jobs and building roads and bridges. So, it is important to keep one\u2019s ear to the ground.<br \/>\nSingh also told him to stay in touch and make deputy governor Mohan feel at home. Mohan was a contender for the governor\u2019s post. He left a few months after Subbarao took over.<br \/>\nMohan was in Jackson Heights, New York City, on an official trip when Chidambaram\u2019s office called him for a formal interview for the governor\u2019s post in August 2008. As finance secretary, Subbarao had the ambition to be the RBI governor (for many of India\u2019s past finance secretaries, RBI governorship was a logical career progression) but till mid-August, when he applied for a week\u2019s leave to visit Hyderabad, he was not sure about getting the job. On 26 August, a few hours before he was to catch a flight to Rio de Janeiro to attend a G-20 meeting, he got a call from Chidambaram, enquiring whether he would be interested in the governor\u2019s job. Being the senior-most IAS officer, Subbarao was in line for the cabinet secretary\u2019s post, which is hierarchically one notch above the governor\u2019s position. At 8pm that evening, he met Rangarajan and Chidambaram at the latter\u2019s house before he left for the airport to catch a 1am flight.<br \/>\nThe half-an-hour interview turned out to be more a sort of business meeting where the three discussed many things. Chidambaram asked his views on having a monetary policy committee at RBI. Subbarao was not in favour of such a committee as he felt its presence would constraint the governor\u2019s decision-making power. Chidambaram was of the view that the governor\u2019s job is very much like the job of a corporate CEO who would need to take the board along with him but Subbarao disagreed. By the time he returned to Delhi after the G-20 meeting on 2 September, the Prime Minister had signed off on his appointment.<br \/>\nGround realities<br \/>\nSubbarao took Singh\u2019s words seriously. He instituted the outreach programme at RBI which takes senior officials of the central bank to remote rural pockets of India so they can stay in touch with the real world. One of the objectives of such outreach programmes is financial inclusion, which means expanding banking services to the unbanked poor. Beyond that, Subbarao wanted his team to get a first-hand understanding of the ground realities, visiting village councils, rural schools and non-governmental organizations. This is one of the many changes that he made at RBI during his five-year tenure.<br \/>\nAmong others, he introduced mid-quarterly reviews of monetary policy and giving guidance on which way policy was leaning. He included academicians and economic journalists in RBI\u2019s pre-policy consultations, simplified the language of the central bank\u2019s reports and press releases and introduced a conference call with analysts after every monetary policy.<br \/>\nIn an interview in July 2009, he listed three things that he would like to achieve as RBI governor\u2014acquiring greater proficiency in managing monetary policy in a globalized context; making RBI more transparent; and demystifying the office of the governor. \u201cI want our staff to understand that even governors do not know everything, that they have to make judgement calls in a context of uncertainty when the pros and cons of their actions are not completely clear.\u201d<br \/>\nHe has succeeded in making RBI more transparent and demystifying the governor\u2019s office but possibly fallen short in managing monetary policy in a globalized context. Indeed, the governor makes judgement calls in uncertain economic situations and many believe that a few of Subbarao\u2019s calls have gone wrong.<br \/>\nArvind Panagariya, professor of economics at Columbia University, describes the Subbarao regime as one of the worst in the history of RBI. In an interview with The Indian Express editor Shekhar Gupta in his weekly Walk the Talk programme on NDTV, Panagariya said RBI made a \u201chuge mistake\u201d in not building up dollar reserves when the rupee had appreciated sharply in 2009-10. The rupee rose 4.9% against dollar in 2009 and 4.07% in 2010.<br \/>\nIts slide started in 2011 when the local unit lost 15.75%. In 2012, it slipped 3.51% and since January the depreciation has been around 17%. His predecessor Reddy bought dollars from the market as he had a problem of plenty\u2014too much of foreign money was pouring in. In fact, he had to drain rupees generated out of dollar buying from the system by selling bonds under a special scheme.<br \/>\nThere are some who find the criticism unfair as by not buying dollar from the market Subbarao merely stuck to the RBI policy of intervention only to iron out volatility in the foreign exchange market and not adding to the dollar reserves. But then, it is up to the governor to follow the policy or change it.<br \/>\nBehind the curve<br \/>\nAnother criticism against Subbarao is that he had always been behind the curve\u2014for far too long he followed an accommodative monetary policy and allowed government bond yield to remain below the inflation level. In other words, he was slow in raising rates and as a result of this, inflation surged. Originating from supply-side problems, inflation became generalized and entrenched and it took years to tame it.<br \/>\nTrue to his wont, Subbarao admitted this. Delivering the 10th Nani Palkhivala Memorial Trust Lecture in Mumbai last week, his last public appearance before he steps down as RBI governor, Subbarao said, \u201cWith the benefit of hindsight, I must admit in all honesty that the economy would have been better served if our monetary tightening had started sooner and had been faster and stronger.\u201d Not too many governors have had the guts to admit policy mistakes.<br \/>\nHis handling of the rupee depreciation since May has also drawn much flak for lack of consistency and coordination with the government and a string of half-hearted attempts that destroyed markets\u2019 confidence in the regulator.<br \/>\nCriticism is not uncalled for but one also needs to appreciate the context in which Subbarao functioned as India\u2019s chief money man. A 1972-batch Indian Administrative Service officer of the Andhra Pradesh cadre (he was the topper in his batch), he took over barely one-and-a-half weeks before US investment bank Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. collapsed and the world plunged into an unprecedented credit crisis.<br \/>\nFor the first one year, he worked closely with the government, cut policy rates to a record low, and flooded the system with money to ward off the impact of the liquidity crisis that swept the world. Too much of money led to a rise in inflation so he had to reverse the trend and started raising interest rates and tightening monetary policy, albeit slowly\u2014a quarter of a percentage point at a time. In December 2009, a little over a year after he took over, the wholesale-price inflation crossed the 7% level, much to the discomfort of the central bank, stayed put at that level and rose even higher till March 2013. Between March 2010 and October 2011, he increased the policy rate a record 13 times.<br \/>\nBy the time RBI came close to bottling up the inflation genie, the rupee started depreciating, the inevitable fallout of a record high current account deficit and the US Federal Reserve\u2019s announcement that it would wind down its bond buying programme, which led to a flight of capital from emerging markets. All of a sudden, Subbarao had to reverse his softening stance and go for draining liquidity and raising short-term rates in defence of the local currency.<br \/>\nUnlike in 2008, when RBI and the Indian government had coordinated monetary and fiscal measures to ward off the impact of the global liquidity crunch, there was virtually no coordination between RBI and the finance ministry in 2013. The differences between the two were pretty obvious on various occasions, ranging from how long RBI\u2019s liquidity tightening measures would be in force to issuance of sovereign bonds to bolster India\u2019s foreign exchange reserves.<br \/>\nGrowth vs inflation<br \/>\nSubbarao is one governor who also got embroiled in the growth-versus-inflation debate, with the ministry perceived to be pushing for growth and RBI to contain inflation. In a July 2009 interview, he had said on top of his agenda was \u201creturning the economy to a high-growth path\u201d. He took pains to clear the misconceptions, saying from various forums that indeed RBI cared for growth and that\u2019s why it fights inflation.<br \/>\nIn his speeches and policy documents, the increasingly frustrated governor has time and again blamed the government for not doing its bit on the fiscal front and not addressing structural issues. He also expressed his helplessness\u2014after all, monetary policy has its limitations and it needs fiscal policy to move in tandem.<br \/>\nTo his credit, ahead of others, RBI was the first to flag India\u2019s precarious balance of payment situation in late 2010.<br \/>\nIn his five-year stint, Subbarao raised the policy rate 13 times and cut it 10 times, making it a record 23 changes in interest rates\u2014the most by any governor in RBI\u2019s 78-year history. Will he be remembered for that alone?<br \/>\nAmong his predecessors in the post-reforms era, Rangarajan is remembered for his monetary tightening to fight an entrenched inflation and abolition of the government\u2019s automatic monetization through ad hoc treasury bills; Bimal Jalan, for protecting India from the contagion of the East Asian currency crisis in the late 1990s and taking the first steps towards capital account convertibility; and Reddy for insulating the Indian financial system from the impact of the global financial crisis.<br \/>\nPeople who know Subbarao well say he is a perfect host who personally looks after every guest at every function that he holds. He is also a voracious reader of non-fiction\u2014not necessarily books on economics.<br \/>\nHe also prepares himself well for every meeting and every speech. He writes his own speeches and revises them again and again till he is satisfied, something which he does with monetary policy documents as well. The fact that he is not a monetary economist was a handicap for the first six months of his tenure, but he overcame that through extensive reading. In his college days he was a member of the Mensa Club\u2014the world\u2019s largest and oldest high IQ society\u2014and knows how to ask the right questions.<br \/>\nInflation and haircut<br \/>\nSpeaking at the Sixth Annual Statistics Day Conference in July 2012, Subbarao said he used to pay Rs.25 for a haircut 20 years ago, which went up to Rs.50 even as his hair thinned. \u201cNow when I have virtually no hair left, I pay Rs.150 for a haircut,\u201d he said. \u201cI struggle to determine how much of that is inflation, how much is the premium I am paying to the barber for the privilege of cutting the governor\u2019s non-existent hair.\u201d<br \/>\nIn yet another barber joke, once in Delhi, he had said that while cutting his hair, his barber kept discussing inflation. Asked about his interest in inflation, the barber told him that every time he uttered the word inflation, it made Subbarao\u2019s hair stand on end, making his own job easier.<br \/>\nLeaving office, Subbarao may take some comfort from the fact that both wholesale price inflation and so-called core inflation, or non-food, non-oil, manufacturing inflation, are relatively low. Retail inflation still continues to be high. Some say that as a governor Subbarao has been singularly unlucky. He took over less than a fortnight before the collapse of Lehman Brothers and he leaves days before the Federal Reserve announces a plan for winding up its economic stimulus programme. One also must consider the fact that Jalan had Reddy as his deputy and Reddy had Mohan as deputy to help them decide on monetary policies; Subbarao hasn\u2019t had a deputy of their stature.<br \/>\nIn a lighter vein, Subbarao once said that the end of the global economic crisis would coincide with his term coming to a close. Indeed, the US economy is in recovery mode and the euro zone crisis is nearing its end, but India is facing a currency and economic crisis of rare dimensions as he prepares to step down.<br \/>\nHad Subbarao stepped down in May, his legacy would have been different. In September 2008, when he took up the assignment, India was one of many countries hit by the global credit crunch. But the currency crisis is mostly India-specific and tackling it has been Subbarao\u2019s biggest challenge in his entire career. He hasn\u2019t met the challenge with aplomb. Does that mean his has been the worst tenure at RBI? As they say, a governor should be judged over a cycle and not when he leaves.<br \/>\nFor the record, after retirement Subbarao, 64, will relocate to Hyderabad, the city which hosts at least two other past governors\u2014Reddy and M. Narasimham (Rangarajan too spends time in the city)\u2014and join the academic world.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Mumbai: If not for anything else, the D. Subbarao regime at the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) that ends with his retirement on Wednesday will&#8230;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":1742,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[3],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-1164","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-blog"],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/bankerstrust.in\/column\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1164","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/bankerstrust.in\/column\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/bankerstrust.in\/column\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/bankerstrust.in\/column\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/bankerstrust.in\/column\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=1164"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/bankerstrust.in\/column\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1164\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":1166,"href":"https:\/\/bankerstrust.in\/column\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1164\/revisions\/1166"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/bankerstrust.in\/column\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/1742"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/bankerstrust.in\/column\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=1164"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/bankerstrust.in\/column\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=1164"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/bankerstrust.in\/column\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=1164"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}